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To test whether atypical number development may affect other types of quantity process-
ing, we investigated temporal discrimination in adults with developmental dyscalculia (DD).
This also allowed us to test whether number and time may be sub-served by a common
quantity system or decision mechanisms: if they do, both should be impaired in dyscalcu-
lia, but if number and time are distinct they should dissociate. Participants judged which
of two successively presented horizontal lines was longer in duration, the ﬁrst line being
preceded by either a small or a large number prime (“1” or “9”) or by a neutral symbol
(“#”), or in a third task participants decided which of two Arabic numbers (either “1,” “5,”
“9”) lasted longer. Results showed that (i) DD’s temporal discriminability was normal as
long as numbers were not part of the experimental design, even as task-irrelevant stimuli;
however (ii) task-irrelevant numbers dramatically disrupted DD’s temporal discriminability
the more their salience increased, though the actual magnitude of the numbers had no
effect; in contrast (iii) controls’ time perception was robust to the presence of numbers
but modulated by numerical quantity: therefore small number primes or numerical stimuli
seemed to make durations appear shorter than veridical, but longer for larger numerical
prime or numerical stimuli. This study is the ﬁrst to show spared temporal discrimination –
a dimension of continuous quantity – in a population with a congenital number impairment.
Our data reinforce the idea of a partially shared quantity system across numerical and tem-
poral dimensions, which supports both dissociations and interactions among dimensions;
however, they suggest that impaired number in DD is unlikely to originate from systems
initially dedicated to continuous quantity processing like time.
Keywords: developmental dyscalculia, time, magnitude, numerosity, number cognition
INTRODUCTION
Developmental dyscalculia (DD) is a congenital and speciﬁc learn-
ing disability affecting the understanding of numerical concepts
and arithmetical information in the context of normal intelligence
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994), and affecting 4–7% of
the population (Shalev et al., 2005; Shalev, 2007). Most research
on DD has focused on the ability to process numbers represented
symbolically or non-symbolically and on arithmetical skills (e.g.,
Butterworth et al., 2011). However, to date, it is still unknown
whether dyscalculia affects solely number quantity processing or
whether it extends to other non-numerical quantity dimensions
such as luminance, physical size, or time. Anecdotally, DD subjects
frequently report poor ability to appreciate time which is often
exempliﬁed by their unreliable punctuality at appointments or by
their inability to plan activities. However, it is unclear whether
these self-reports reﬂect a genuine disability in time perception
and cognition, or whether they are more related to a difﬁculty
in performing numerical operations relating to time, for instance
in calculating how much time is needed to get to an appoint-
ment. In this study we aimed to explore the relation between time
and numbers from the perspective of atypical number develop-
ment in dyscalculia. Speciﬁcally, we aimed to test whether con-
genitally malfunctioning number processing may extend to time
processing.
Suggestive evidence that dyscalculia may impair continuous
dimensions as well as processing of numbers comes from the
observation that DD children are slower than controls in compar-
ing the physical size of Arabic numerals (Rousselle and Noël, 2007;
but see Landerl et al., 2004). Moreover, in numerical Stroop-like
tasks,where trials of congruent physical and numerical magnitude
typically result in faster and more accurate responses, no facilita-
tion is reported in both adults and children with DD (Rubinsten
and Henik, 2005; Landerl and Kölle, 2009). To date, no studies
have explored the continuous dimension of time in DD.
Investigating time processing in DD could also clarify the rela-
tion between numbers and time. Speciﬁcally, it may elucidate
whether these magnitude dimensions are processed through (1)
a single accumulator that can operate in either the time or the
numerositymode (Meck andChurch,1983), an idea recently refor-
mulated in terms of an approximation system (e.g., Feingenson,
2007; Cantlon et al., 2009), or a “metric” system for action (Walsh,
2003, see Figure 1A); or (2) via dimension-speciﬁc mechanisms,
whereby magnitude information is processed independently for
each dimension (e.g., Agrillo et al., 2010; Dehaene and Brannon,
2011, see Figure 1B). A third possibility is that time and number
share the same operational mechanisms, for instance comparison
mechanisms or decision components (Cohen Kadosh and Walsh,
2008). This hypothesis has so far been tested in the case of space
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FIGURE 1 | Possible links between number and time. (A) Number and
time fully share a single magnitude system, initially hypothesized as an
“internal accumulator” representing information about either the
numerosity or the duration of events/objects at one given time (e.g., Meck
and Church, 1983); a single magnitude system would predict no
dissociations between number and time and no interactions between
them. (B) Number and time are fully independent, such that magnitude
information is analyzed according to metrics unique to each dimension and
therefore dissociations but no interactions are expected between
dimensions (e.g., Murphy, 1996, 1997; Agrillo et al., 2010; Dehaene and
Brannon, 2011). (C) Number andTime partly share a magnitude system (or
possibly operational mechanisms depicted in gray stripes) and are also
implemented by dimension-speciﬁc processes, such that interactions are
possible as well as dissociation among dimensions if the dimension-speciﬁc
processes are selectively impaired (ATOM,Walsh, 2003; Cantlon et al.,
2009; Cappelletti et al., 2009, 2011). (D) Symbolic numbers may recycle
systems dedicated to number or numerosity processing but are unlikely to
recycle systems dedicated to continuous quantity processing like time.
and number whereby decision rather than representational sys-
tems seem to be in common between these magnitude dimensions
(Tang et al., 2006; Santens and Gevers, 2008; Santens and Verguts,
2011).
In the present study we reasoned that if number and time are
both impaired in DD, this might suggest that they share a mag-
nitude representation or operational mechanisms; on the other
hand, if time processing is spared in DD – who by diagnosis
have impaired number processing – then either these magnitude
dimensions are implemented by distinct magnitude systems or
they only partly share a common magnitude system or operational
mechanisms. Secondly, we aimed to test whether time processing
could nevertheless be modulated by numerical magnitude. Such
modulation of numbers on time has been previously found in
healthy participants as well as in patients (Dormal et al., 2006;
Xuan et al., 2007; Cappelletti et al., 2009, 2011), but not stud-
ied in congenital impairments of numbers. We therefore tested
possible interactions between numbers and time, which would be
expected given a fully or partly shared magnitude or operational
system. Conversely, no inﬂuence of numbers on time processing
might be expected if these dimensions are implemented by fully
independent systems which do not interact with each other.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
All participants were neurologically normal, with normal or cor-
rected to normal vision. They were all naïve to the purpose of the
study and all gave informed consent to participate and were paid
for their participation. The study was approved by the Local Ethics
Committee.
Adults with developmental dyscalculia
Twelve right-handed English-speaking DD adults took part in
the study (one male; mean age: 43.8 years). They were diagnosed
with dyscalculia on the basis of the Dyscalculia Screener (Butter-
worth, 2003) and of additional standardized numerical tasks (see
below). DD participants also undertook cognitive assessment to
test general intelligence.
All 12 participants obtained a standardized score below the cut-
off point in the Dyscalculia Screener (see below); they were also
impaired in two standardized calculation tests (the Graded Difﬁ-
culty Arithmetical test, Jackson and Warrington, 1986; the subtest
of the WAIS, Wechsler, 1986), and in number comparison, a key
test to reveal intact number processing. In this task,DD revealed an
abnormally large distance effect (Moyer and Landauer, 1967) such
that the time required to discriminate between stimuli numer-
ically close was abnormally long relative to controls, consistent
with some previous studies (e.g., Rousselle and Noël, 2007). In
contrast, they obtained an average or high average IQ suggesting
preserved intellectual functioning (see Table 1).
Control subjects
Overall 22 right-handed adults participated in the study (6 males
and 16 females, mean age: 43.2 years, range 25–70).
THE DYSCALCULIA SCREENER
The Dyscalculia Screener (Butterworth, 2003) is a standardized
computer-based test that comprises four item-timed tasks. These
four tasks are divided into two subscales: a “capacity subscale,”
which involves a dot enumeration task and a number comparison
task, and an “achievement subscale,” which involves two maths
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Table 1 | Dyscalculic participants’ performance in the Dyscalculia Screener and in other background tasks. Percent correct or scaled-scores.
Tasks performed Individual DD
All DD (N=12) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
IQa 110.29 113.5 117 105 150 112.5 98.5 94 118 102 103.5 102.5 107
DD screenerb
Capacity subscale 2.46 2 1.5 2 2.5 4.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 4.5 2 1.5
Dot enumeration 3 2 2 3 3 3 1 4 3 3 2 1
Number comparison 1 1 2 2 6 2 2 1 2 6 2 2
Achievement subscale 2.42 3 2 2 3.5 3 1.5 2 3.5 1.5 3 2.5 1.5
Addition 4 2 2 3 3 2 2 4 2 4 3 2
Multiplication 2 2 2 4 3 1 2 3 1 2 2 1
GDA (N=24)c 7.08 [3] 10 [3] 8 [3] 5 [1] 8 [3] 7 [3] 3 [1] 6 [2] 10 [3] 7 [3] 10 [3] 3 [1] 8 [3]
WAIS maths (N =20)d 6.6 8 6 6 8 8 6 7 9 6 6 6 4
Number comparison (N =68) 96.39
RTs: 878.8ms
(dee:184.9ms)
Digit spanf 17.91 23 18 20 17 15 15 20 27 13 13 15 19
aWAIS-3 (Wechsler, 1986).
bStanine score ranging from 1 to 9 whereby the better the performance the higher the stanine score (see Butterworth, 2003).
cGraded Difﬁculty Arithmetic Test, Jackson and Warrington, 1986; scaled-score and correspondent level of performance in brackets (1=defective, 2=borderline,
3=dull average).
dAge-adjusted scores on a scale between 1 and 19 where 10 is average.
ede, distance effect (mean across DD participants in milliseconds, ms); signiﬁcantly different from controls [79.82ms, t(11)=7.56, p=0.001].
fIncludes forward and backward; max combined score=30.
Impaired performance is shown in bold.
veriﬁcation tasks (Butterworth, 2003; Iuculano et al., 2008). The
software diagnoses DD on the basis of norms derived from perfor-
mance expressed as an inverse efﬁciency score (median reaction
times multiplied by error-rate) which is known to be important
in the diagnosis of arithmetical learning disabilities (Jordan et al.,
2002; Landerl et al., 2004; Butterworth, 2005).
To be classiﬁed as dyscalculic, participants had to obtain: (1)
a standardized score below 81 on at least one of the two tasks of
the “capacity subscale” of the Dyscalculia Screener (test average
of the nationally standardized score = 100, SD= 15); (2) an IQ
score within the normal range (full-scale IQ not below 80); and
(3) impaired performance in two additional standardized tests of
maths (the Graded Difﬁculty Arithmetic Task, Jackson and War-
rington, 1986 and the subtest of the WAIS-R, Wechsler, 1986, see
Table 1).
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Since dyscalculic participants often claim that their time process-
ing is inaccurate, we ﬁrst aimed to provide a preliminary measure
of time performance. We used four tasks that resembled as much
as possible everyday situations requiring either an estimate or
a more precise calculation of time. The “time estimation” task
required participants to estimate the time needed to perform
familiar actions (e.g.,making a cupof tea) or the duration of events
(e.g., ﬂying fromLondon toNewYork). The“time calculation”task
required participants to perform calculation on numbers indicat-
ing time (e.g., If the time is now 10.35 p.m., what time will it be
in 2 h and 50min?). The “knowledge of exact temporal facts” task
required participants to answer questions about precise temporal
facts (e.g., how many hours in a day?). The “time comparison”
task required participants to indicate the later time among two
expressed as 24-h clock (e.g., “11.45” or “15.30”). All problems
were orally presented for un-speeded, oral responses. For these
preliminary tasks, DD participants were compared to a group of
12 age-matched controls which were part of a larger sample and
differed from those that took part in the experimental tasks (mean
age= 51.2; range: 25–70).
Dyscalculic participants were accurate at estimating the dura-
tion of events or actions [no difference fromcontrols, t (11)= 0.64,
p = 0.51 ns] as well as at comparing times [t (11)= 0.12, p = 0.38
ns]; their knowledge of exact temporal facts was also pre-
served [t (11)= 0.85, p = 0.2 ns]. However, they were signiﬁcantly
worse than controls when performing the time calculation task
[t (11)= 2.54, p = 0.03]. This seems consistent with dyscalculics’
self-report of their time processing not being accurate. The exper-
imental investigation aimed to further explore time processing in
DD.
EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION
Therewere three different experimental conditions assessing dura-
tion discrimination in the presence of irrelevant symbolic or
numerical stimuli. All these experimental conditions have been
previously validated in both control participants and in neuro-
logical patients and are known to engage time processing in the
range of sub-second durations (see Cappelletti et al., 2009, 2011).
These durations were chosen as most theories and research on
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time processing are based on sub-second durations (e.g., Ivry
and Spencer, 2004; Karmarkar and Buonomano, 2007); there-
fore choosing short durations allowed us to interpret the ﬁnd-
ings with respect to these theories. Participants performed the
three conditions in counterbalanced order. All experimental con-
ditions required participants to judge which of two temporal
intervals lasted longer using a two-interval forced-choice para-
digm. Numerical stimuli were always task-irrelevant but the three
conditions differed in terms of the degree of indirect involvement
of these numerical stimuli (see below).
STIMULI
Stimulus presentation and data collection were controlled using
theCogentGraphics toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/)
and Matlab7.0 software on a Sony S2VP laptop computer. Stim-
uli were viewed on the computer’s built-in liquid-crystal screen,
which subtended a visual angle of 20.8˚ horizontal by 15.83˚ ver-
tical from a viewing distance of about 50 cm. A chin-rest was used
to stabilize head position. Video mode was 640× 480 pixels, with
60Hz refresh rate.
Symbol and number prime conditions
High-contrast white horizontal lines (length 10.29˚ of visual angle,
width 0.17˚) were presented on a black background. The two lines
were centered on the vertical meridian and presented sequentially
in a two-interval discrimination paradigm, one line 5.07˚ above
the horizontal meridian and the other 5.07˚ below (see Figure 2).
The ﬁrst of the lines in the two-interval sequence (Reference line)
FIGURE 2 | Experimental design in the (A) symbol and (B) the number
prime conditions, participants judged which of two horizontal lines
lasted longer, with the reference line preceded respectively by a
non-numerical (“#,” Symbol Prime Condition) or a numerical prime
(“1” or “9,” Number Prime Condition). In the “1–5–9” Condition (C),
participants judged temporal durations directly on Arabic numbers.
had always a duration of 600ms. The second line (Test line) could
vary in duration according to the Method of Constant Stimuli.
Test durations spanned a range of −240 to 240ms (i.e., from 360
to 840ms in steps of 60ms) including the Reference duration of
600ms.
Two types of prime were used: the symbol “#” (Symbol Prime
Condition, see Figure 2A) or two Arabic numbers, i.e., “1” or “9”
(Number Prime Condition, see Figure 2B). Both types of prime
subtended 0.87˚ vertically and between 0.25˚ and 0.65˚ horizon-
tally and were presented in white Helvetica font at the center of
the display.
“1–5–9” condition
This was adapted from an existing paradigm (Oliveri et al., 2008)
and previously used to assess time processing in a neurological
patient (Cappelletti et al., 2009). The stimuli consisted of sequen-
tial pairs among three possible Arabic numbers (“1,” “5,” “9”)
subtending 1.72˚ of visual angle and presented in a two-interval
discrimination paradigm, one number 5.07˚ above the horizon-
tal meridian and the other 5.07˚ below in randomized order (see
Figure 2C).
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Symbol and number prime conditions
Each trial began with a centrally displayed ﬁxation spot, which
remained visible until a key press from the participant. The prime
was then immediately displayed centrally for 200ms. A blank
interval of 100ms preceded the ﬁrst line display (Reference line)
appearing at the top (or bottom) of the computer screen, followed
after an inter-stimulus-interval of 100ms by the second line dis-
play (Test line) appearing at the bottom (or top) of the computer
monitor. The screen then remained blank with a white cross in
the middle until a response from the subject. As our interest was
primarily in the accuracy of temporal discrimination rather than
speed of information processing, there was no time-pressure to
respond and no measure of response times. The next trial imme-
diately followed the response. In the Symbol and Number Prime
Conditions, Test values were randomly sampled without replace-
ment from a set of equally spaced values bracketing the Reference
value with equal frequency. Nine values were used to improve reli-
ability of psychometric curve-ﬁtting; in each experimental block
of the Number Prime Condition, number primes were randomly
sampled from the two possible values with equal frequency. In the
Symbol Prime Condition, there were 40 observations for each test
duration, yielding a total of 360 trials, presented over 4 blocks of
90 trials. In Number Prime Condition, there were 40 observations
for each cell of the design (9 levels× 2 primes), yielding a total of
720 trials, presented over 8 blocks of 90 trials.
“1–5–9” condition
Trials began with a central ﬁxation point that remained visible
until a key press from the participants. The ﬁrst number then
appeared on the top (or bottom) part of the computer screen for
600ms followed by an ISI of 200ms and by the second number,
appearing on the bottom (or top) part of the computer screen.
The ﬁrst number was a 600ms ﬁxed-duration reference number
(“5”) while the second number could be either “1,”“5,” or “9,” and
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was either of a shorter or longer duration relative to the reference.
A range of durations between 360 and 840ms was used in steps of
60ms, with four shorter and four longer durations plus the refer-
ence, presented in equal proportion in 450 trials. These durations
were chosen on the basis of previous studies with neurological
patients (Harrington et al., 2004; Cappelletti et al., 2009). Only
Test numbers “1,”“5,” and “9” rather than the whole range from 1
to 9 was used. This is because we aimed to keep the task’s overall
length adequate to be administered to our participants while max-
imizing the chance to observe any effect of numerical magnitude
on time perception. Therefore, only numbers at the extreme of
the single-digit range, i.e., the smallest and the largest were used.
After the disappearance of the second digit the screen remained
blank until a response was made. There was no time-pressure to
respond.
PROCEDURE
Participants were seated comfortably in a quiet room with their
head in a chin-rest, facing the computer screen under normal ﬂuo-
rescent room lighting. In each experiment, at the end of each trial
participants were instructed to indicate whether the top or the
bottom horizontal line or number lasted longer using the top or
bottom-arrow keys on the laptop keyboard. For each experimental
condition, participants had at least 20 practice trials prior to the
ﬁrst experimental block, although an additional practice block was
run where necessary to ensure familiarity with the task. Practice
trials were not included in analysis.
DATA ANALYSIS
Accuracy
A general measure of accuracy was computed for each subject as
the proportion of all trials in which the subject correctly indicated
the location of the line or the number that lasted longer. A higher
accuracy score indicates that the subject found it overall easier to
discriminate the reference from the test durations.
Point of subjective equality (PSE)
For each subject, experimental condition and prime type, we ﬁrst
constructed a psychometric function relating the proportion of
trials in which the subject’s response (whether correctly or incor-
rectly) identiﬁed the Test stimulus as longer than the Reference.
We then interpolated the psychometric function with a logistic
curve, using a least-squares algorithm provided by the PSIGNIFIT
toolbox for Matlab (Wichmann and Hill, 2001). To ﬁnd the point
of subjective equality (PSE) we then read off the Test duration
at which “Test longer” responses are 50% (i.e., the Test is percep-
tually indistinguishable in duration from the Reference). In the
Number Prime and the “1–5–9” Conditions we also compared
performance with the two numerical primes to test any possible
interactions between time and numbers.
Just noticeable difference (JND)
Using the ﬁtting procedure described above, we also obtained
the just noticeable difference (JNDs) for each participant. This
measures the minimal difference in duration between Test and
Reference line or number that could be discriminated with reli-
able accuracy. The JND was computed by reading off from the
ﬁtted psychometric function the Test durations at which 25 and
75% of the responses indicated “Test longer,” then dividing the
difference between these two durations by two (Coren et al., 1999;
Cousineau, 2005).
In all experimental conditions, accuracy, PSEs, and JNDs were
entered into separate Analyses of Variance (ANOVA), with exper-
imental condition and group as factors. Moreover, performance
in the different primes (“1,” “9,” and “#”) and numerical stimuli
(“1,”“5,”“9”) was compared in planned t -tests as described in the
Result sessions below.
RESULTS
ACCURACY
There was a signiﬁcant effect of experimental condition [F(2,
44)= 4.9, p< 0.01], of group [F(1, 22)= 5.1, p = 0.03], and a sig-
niﬁcant condition by group interaction [F(2, 44)= 5.0, p< 0.01].
Speciﬁcally, accuracy did not differ between DD and controls in
the Symbol Prime condition [t (22)= 1.3, p = 0.2, ns], but strik-
ingly in the identical time discrimination taskwith number primes
(Number Prime Condition), DD, and controls’ performance dif-
fered signiﬁcantly [t (22)= 2.4, p< 0.03]. Likewise, controls and
DD’s accuracy differed signiﬁcantly in the “1–5–9” Condition
[t (22)= 2.3, p = 0.04].
JUST NOTICEABLE DIFFERENCE
There was a signiﬁcant main effect of experimental condition
[F(2, 44)= 4.9, p = 0.012], of group [F(1, 22)= 7.7, p = 0.03],
and a signiﬁcant condition by group interaction [F(2, 44)= 4.99,
p = 0.01]. Speciﬁcally, DD and controls differed signiﬁcantly only
when numbers were part of the experimental paradigm, i.e., in the
Number Prime Condition [t (22)= 2.1, p = 0.04] and the “1–5–9”
Condition [t (22)= 2.2, p = 0.03], but not in the Symbol Prime
Condition [t (22)= 0.76, p = 0.4, ns, see Figure 3].
POINT OF SUBJECTIVE EQUALITY
There was a signiﬁcant main effect of experimental condition
[F(2, 44)= 7.6, p = 0.001], of group [F(2, 22)= 52.3, p< 0.001]
and a signiﬁcant interaction of experimental condition and group
[F(2, 44)= 15.3, p< 0.001]. DD and controls differed signiﬁ-
cantly in all experimental conditions, such that DD over-estimated
the duration of the ﬁrst stimulus [Symbol Prime Condition:
t (22)= 7.0, p< 0.001, Number Prime Condition: t (22)= 4.8,
p< 0.001; “1–5–9”Condition: t (22)= 2.3, p = 0.03, see Figure 3].
A further analysis of the primes used showed that in the Num-
ber Prime Condition, DD showed no difference between priming
conditions [t (11)= 0.79, p = 0.44, ns], such that numerical quan-
tity did not modulate their performance. In contrast, in controls
PSE’s for both primes were signiﬁcantly shorter in duration than
the Reference of 600ms [“1” prime: t (11)= 5.02, p< 0.001; “9”
prime: t (11)= 3.92, p = 0.004]. The difference between the prim-
ing conditions in controls was highly signiﬁcant [t (11)= 3.4,
p = 0.005], consistent with the Reference duration being perceived
as approximately 20ms shorter when preceded by a low-valued
prime compared to a high-valued prime.
In the “1–5–9” Condition, an analysis on the values indicat-
ing proportion of test “longer” responses for each number indi-
cated that DD’s performance was not modulated by the quantity
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FIGURE 3 | Performance in all experimental conditions and modulation
of numerical stimuli in the number prime and the “1–5–9” conditions.
Performance in the three time discrimination conditions is described in
terms of accuracy, just noticeable difference (JNDs), and point of subjective
equality (PSE) for DD and control participants. Asterisk indicate statistical
signiﬁcance for the difference between the two groups of participants or
between stimuli (i.e., “1” vs. “9” prime conditions). Values on the y -axis
indicate how much longer (positive) or shorter (negative) a stimulus had to
be displayed in order to be perceived as different from the reference
stimulus (JNDs) or of the same duration of the reference stimulus (PSEs).
expressed by numbers stimuli [F(2, 22)= 1.5, p = 0.24, ns]. In
contrast, quantity modulated controls’ responses [F(2, 22)= 3.2,
p = 0.05]. The results of ﬁtting PSE’s to the controls’ data revealed
that relative to the test value “5,” the duration of the test value
of “9” had to be about 30ms shorter [t (11)= 3.22, p = 0.008]
in order to be perceived as equal to the reference stimulus “5”
whereas the duration of the test value “1” had to be only 12ms
shorter [t (11)= 1.9, p = 0.05]. DD participants’ PSE’s indicated a
signiﬁcant over-estimation relative to controls for the numerical
values “5” and “9” but not “1” [number “1”: t (22)= 0.8, p = 0.9,
ns; number “5”: t (22)= 2.2, p = 0.03; number “9”: t (22)= 2.2,
p = 0.04, see Figure 3].
COMPARISON OF EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS
We directly compared performance within each group in the
three experimental conditions. Performance expressed as JNDs
showed that DD differed in the Symbol Prime Condition
relative to the Number Prime and the “1–5–9” Conditions
[t (11)= 3.2, p = 0.009 and t (11)= 2.5, p< 0.02 respectively] and
only marginally in the Number Prime Condition relative to “1–
5–9” Condition [t (11)= 2.0, p = 0.06]. In contrast, control par-
ticipants’ performance did not differ in any of these experimental
Conditions [Symbol vs. Number Prime: t (11)= 0.3, p = 0.7, ns;
Symbol Prime vs. “1–5–9”: t (11)= 0.2, p = 0.8, ns; Number Prime
vs. “1–5–9”: t (11)= 0.29, p = 0.77, ns].
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TIME PERFORMANCE AND NUMERICAL
SKILLS
InDDparticipants, the degree of numerical impairment expressed
by the Dyscalculia Screener (Butterworth, 2003) negatively corre-
lated with performance in time discrimination irrespective of the
prime or the stimuli used (Symbol Prime Condition: R2 = 0.68,
p< 0.001;Number Prime Condition:R2 = 0.41,p< 0.03;“1–5–9”
Condition: R2 = 0.31, p = 0.05). Since this correlation is based on
JNDs, whereby the smaller the value the better the performance,
the relation between numerical impairment and time discrimi-
nation is actually positive. This therefore suggests that the more
severe the degree of dyscalculia, the more impaired time discrim-
ination was (see Figure 4). Note that we did not measure control
participants with the Dyscalculia Screener, so it remains to be
tested whether such correlation may exist in the numerically nor-
mal population aswell orwhether itmay be speciﬁc to dyscalculics.
However performance in time discrimination did not correlate
with any other mathematical tasks.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we undertook a detailed investigation of number
and time processing in adults with DD and in control par-
ticipants. Consistent with their diagnosis, our DD participants
were impaired in numerical processing as indicated by an abnor-
mally large distance effect when comparing Arabic numerals, by
their poor performance in arithmetic tasks and in numerosity
estimation. There were three principle ﬁndings: (i) in contrast
to their numerical impairment, DD’s temporal discrimination
showed comparable acuity to controls, with reliable discrimina-
tion between two lines differing in duration (in the presence of
symbol primes); (ii) in DD discrimination became abnormally
poor when the identical line stimuli were preceded by numerical
primes, even though these were task-irrelevant, or when durations
were judged on numerical stimuli directly; (iii) there were distinct
interactions between time and numbers for controls vs DDs: for
controls, but not DD, the perception of duration appeared to be
modulated by the value of task-irrelevant numbers. For example,
durations were reported as shorter than veridical in the presence
of smaller numbers compared to large numbers, consistent with
previous ﬁndings (Dormal et al., 2006; Cappelletti et al., 2009,
2011). However, the absence of such numerical modulation in DD
could be explained by their impaired number processing.
Temporal discriminability in DD degraded further with
increasing salience of the task-irrelevant numerical stimuli. For
instance,when temporal discriminationwasperformeddirectly on
numerical stimuli (“1–5–9”Condition), DDs were more impaired
relative to the task where numbers only appeared as primes (Num-
ber Prime Condition). DDs’ impaired temporal discrimination is
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FIGURE 4 | Correlations between the degree of dyscalculia expressed by the Dyscalculia Screener (Butterworth, 2003) and proficiency in time
discrimination in all the experimental conditions in dyscalculic participants only.
unlikely to be due to task difﬁculty as at least two of our time tasks
(Symbol and Number Prime Condition) were identical except
from the type of prime used, and yet DD’s performed signiﬁcantly
differently. Moreover, these tasks were not intrinsically dissimilar
in their difﬁculty level as there was no difference in control partici-
pants’ performance whose discriminability remained stable across
these conditions. Likewise, DDs’ impaired time discrimination is
unlikely to be caused by attention or working memory deﬁcits,
which are sometimes associated with dyscalculia (Rubinsten and
Henik, 2005; Ashkenazi et al., 2009), as these deﬁcits would have
affected the three experiments equally.
A PARTLY SHARED MAGNITUDE SYSTEM OR DECISION COMPONENT
The dissociation between time and numbers, and their interac-
tion are problematic for the proposal of a fully shared magnitude
mechanism similar to Meck and Church’s (1983) mode-control
model (see Figure 1A), which would predict equal impairment
of different magnitude dimensions. Furthermore, the interaction
between time and numbers observed in control participants and
the impaired time discrimination in the presence of numerical
stimuli in DDs challenge the notion of fully independent magni-
tude dimensions which would not predict any inﬂuence of one
dimension on another (see Figure 1B, e.g., Murphy, 1996, 1997;
Dehaene and Brannon, 2011).
Instead, we suggest that the dissociation between time and
numbers observed in DD participants is best explained by the
proposal of a magnitude system partly shared among dimensions.
This is the idea that besides sharing amagnitude systemor possibly
decision-level components (Huntley-Fenner et al., 2002; McCrink
and Wynn, 2004; Cohen Kadosh et al., 2007), number and time
are also implemented by dimension-speciﬁc processes (e.g.,Walsh,
2003; Cantlon et al., 2009; Cappelletti et al., 2009, 2011; Dehaene
and Brannon, 2011, see also Figure 1C). Critically, a partly shared
mechanism would account for correlations and interactions as
well as dissociations among dimensions. A positive correlation
such as that observed between DD’s numerical ability and JND in
temporal discrimination can be explained by shared mechanisms
where performance of both magnitude dimensions depends on
how efﬁciently the common mechanism is functioning, which can
vary between individuals; interactions can be explained by assum-
ing cross-talk between the dimensions processed by the same
shared mechanisms. Conversely dissociation can be explained by
selective impairments of the non-overlapping dimension-speciﬁc
processes. Therefore, this would account for the dissociation
between number and time in DD as well as for the interaction
of number magnitude on time performance. The proposal of
a partly shared magnitude system would concur with ﬁndings
of two recent neuropsychological studies showing that time and
numbers doubly dissociate, even while numbers interacted with
time perception in one of the patients (Cappelletti et al., 2009,
2011).
Whether time and number only share decision mechanisms
rather than a magnitude system is difﬁcult to address with the cur-
rent data. These decision components have recently been shown
to account – at least partially – for interactions between space and
number (e.g., Tang et al., 2006; Santens and Gevers, 2008; Santens
and Verguts, 2011), but no studies have yet looked at whether this
may also be the case for time and number.
NUMBERS DO NOT ORIGINATE FROM TEMPORAL MECHANISMS
Besides supporting the possibility that number and time processes
a partly share magnitude system, our data allow us to make a sug-
gestion on the origin of these processes. We propose that number
symbols are unlikely to develop from mechanisms originally ded-
icated to more primitive continuous quantity dimension such as
time. The hypothesis that some recent cognitive abilities such as
symbolic numbers, maths, or reading may have re-used mecha-
nisms initially devoted to evolutionarily relevant skills is referred
to as “recycling” or “redeployment” (e.g., Gould and Vrba, 1982;
Dehaene and Cohen, 2007; Anderson, 2010). For instance, it has
been suggested that symbolic numbers originate from a pre-verbal
system for quantiﬁcation, i.e., the approximate number system
(“ANS,” Feigenson et al., 2004; Halberda et al., 2008) as indicated
for example by the children’s initial use of analog criteria to make
magnitude judgments then followed by discrete ones (e.g., Feigen-
son et al., 2002;Hurewitz et al., 2006, see Figure 1D). The recycling
idea has recently been expanded to suggest that some mechanisms
initially representing time and space are subsequently used to rep-
resent numbers (Cohen Kadosh andWalsh, 2008; Bueti andWalsh,
2009). Following this suggestion, congenital disorders with num-
bers could either be due to: (i) some aspects of the recycling process
that failed, or (ii) symbolic numbers originating from an impaired
primordial system. This latter possibility has been suggested for
symbolic numbers relative to the ANS, as a link between impaired
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symbolic numbers and ANS has recently been shown in dyscal-
culia (e.g., Gilmore et al., 2010; Piazza et al., 2010). However, it
has been argued by Butterworth (2010) that neither continuous
quantity nor approximate numerosities can be foundational for
understanding symbolic numbers or arithmetic.
At present our data do not allow us to establish whether
impaired symbolic numbers may be due to a dysfunction in the
recycling process of a continuous quantity dimension into num-
bers. However, concerning the second possibility, it seems unlikely
that impaired symbolic numbers originated from impaired time
processing as this was spared in our participants. This evidence
converges with recent results challenging the idea that sym-
bolic numbers may originate from continuous dimensions. For
instance, single cell recording in monkeys’ IPS regions failed
to show the expected correlation between neurons indepen-
dently coding for continuous and numerical quantities (Tudus-
ciuc and Nieder, 2007). Such correlations would be expected
if these neurons had been recycled to represent different types
of quantity. In line with this evidence, we have also recently
found that symbolic numbers and continuous quantities such
as time and space do not correlate and that they are each
associated with structural differences in distinct regions of the
brain (Cappelletti et al., under review), also consistent with a
previous imaging study (Castelli et al., 2006). Taken together
these ﬁndings concur to suggest that continuous quantities like
time and space are unlikely to be predecessors of symbolic
numbers.
It remains to be explained how numbers worsen time discrim-
ination which was otherwise intact in DD. One possibility is that
numbers might generally exert an inﬂuence on the perception
of time but in DD the inﬂuence from impaired numbers was
unsystematic. The resulting inconsistency of temporal judgments
could explain why in DD we observed increased JNDs for tem-
poral discrimination but no systematic bias of number value on
our measure of subjective duration. In controls, by contrast, pre-
served numbers would inﬂuence time processing systematically,
leading to consistent biases in estimation of temporal intervals
(with low numbers decreasing subjective duration and high num-
ber increasing it), while leaving their JNDs unaffected. We suggest
that numbers exert such an effect on time because this is a “weak”
magnitudedimension,which canbemore readily disruptedby sev-
eral factors for instance the Triesman clicks (Treisman and Brogan,
1992), the presentation of “ﬁlled” or “empty” stimuli (Ramm-
sayer and Lima, 1991), dual tasks (e.g., Casini and Macar, 1997),
and manipulations of dopamine and acetylcholine (Meck, 1996).
Therefore the combination of impaired numbers and of weak time
may explain the impairment of temporal discrimination in the
presence of numbers in DD.
TIME PROCESSING AND THEORIES OF DYSCALCULIA
To the best of our knowledge time processing has not previ-
ously been investigated in dyscalculic participants, and the current
theories of dyscalculia are silent about the possible interactions
between dyscalculia and the processing of time and other con-
tinuous dimensions. These theories focus mainly on the possible
origin of dyscalculia. One of them claims that dyscalculia is likely
to be due to impaired ANS, the system that maps approximate
numerosities onto an analog magnitude and that is thought to be
a precursor of symbolic number processing and maths (Gilmore
et al., 2010). Based on this idea, dyscalculics are impaired in num-
ber processing because the Weber fraction (essentially their JND)
of the analog representations is large and they are poor at dis-
criminating these magnitudes (Gilmore et al., 2010; Piazza et al.,
2010). However, it has also been argued that dyscalculia is due
to defective “number module” that represents small numerosi-
ties discretely and not as analog magnitudes (Butterworth, 2010;
Butterworth et al., 2011). Such impairment would lead to further
difﬁculties in processing numbers symbolically and in maths. A
third set of theories have suggested that dyscalculia is due to a
failure in linking preserved numerical concepts to their symbols,
therefore implying that impairments should mainly occur when
symbolic processing of numbers is required (e.g., Rubinsten and
Henik, 2005; Rousselle and Noël, 2007). None of these theories
offer an explicit account of how dyscalculics may process con-
tinuous quantity, though a possible extrapolation from the ANS
account would be that any stimulus represented in terms of analog
magnitudes would be affected including time.
Prior to this study, a very few investigations that have focused
on DDs’ processing of the continuous dimension of space and
in one case of luminance, using Stroop-like paradigms. These
showed lack of facilitation in congruent trials in DD relative to
controls (Rubinsten and Henik, 2005; Rousselle and Noël, 2007;
Landerl and Kölle, 2009; but see Landerl et al., 2004). At ﬁrst
glance, our results may appear different from these previous stud-
ies. However, continuous dimensions in DD have so far always
been tested directly on numerical stimuli – such as selecting the
numerically greater of 3 and 7 – and that there is no evidence
on how these dimensions would be processed in a neutral context
with no symbolic numbers. Indeed, our results suggest that the
mere presence of number stimuli distorts time processing. More-
over, ﬁner details of the participants’performance such as the PSEs
or JNDs have not previously been looked at, although they have
been crucial to characterize DDs’ performance as shown in the
present study. Here we suggest that the current theories of dyscal-
culia need to be expanded to account for processing of continuous
quantity.
CONCLUSION
The present study provides evidence that in adults with dyscal-
culia continuous quantity such as time processing is not affected
by atypical number development, although numbers can inter-
act or even disrupt time processing. This suggests that time and
numbers are at least partially independent, with some cross-talk
between these dimensions. Moreover, these results endorse the
proposal that numbers are unlikely to have “recycled” some cog-
nitive resources otherwise used by other more ancient magnitude
dimensions such as time.
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